Abstract. Lattice-based cryptography has received signi cant attention from security practitioners in the past decade. It exhibits attractive properties, including being a major post-quantum cryptography candidate, enjoying worst-case to average-case security reductions, and being supported by e cient implementations. In this paper, we propose three practical lattice-based Authenticated Encryption (AE) schemes. These schemes are provably secure assuming hardness of basic lattice problems. The proposed schemes have remarkable motivations and advantages over widely-used AEs as follows. These schemes are alternatives to current conventional and post-quantum AE schemes in the post-quantum era. Moreover, composing the proposed AEs with a lattice-based asymmetric key distribution scheme results in a hybrid encryption, which depends only on one (type of) security assumption. The implementation of such hybrid encryption can make use of speci c optimizations regarding, e.g., code size in software, and gate equivalent or FPGA area usage in hardware. That is because the symmetric and asymmetric algorithms have some common primitive computations. To evaluate the performance of the proposed AEs, we implement them on current Intel CPUs and benchmark them to encrypt messages of various sizes. The most e cient proposed scheme is only 12% slower than AES-256-GCM for 40-byte messages on Sandy Bridge, and 34% faster for 1500-byte messages.
Introduction
Lattice-based cryptography is one of the main candidates for post-quantum cryptography [1] . Cryptographic schemes based on hard lattice problems are conjectured to resist against attacks by a large-scale quantum computer [2] , while the schemes based on the hardness of integer factorization, integer discrete logarithm, and elliptic curve discrete logarithm are completely vulnerable in this setting [3, 4] . Other advantages of the lattice-based schemes, in comparison to widely-used ones based on number theory (such as RSA and ECDSA), are as follows. Most of the stateof-the-art lattice-based schemes enjoy a worst-case to average-case security reduction (e.g., [5] [6] [7] ). Thus, random instances of these schemes (i.e., with random keys and/or parameters) are provably as hard as worstcase instances of basic lattice problems. Finally, computations in lattice-based schemes usually deal with simple operations on small integer vectors. In doing so, engineers can design e cient implementations on hardware and software, and take more advantage from hardware parallelism, processor pipelines, mul-tiple cores, and the single-instruction multiple-data (SIMD) feature. As a result, modern implementations of the lattice-based schemes are much more e cient than the traditional alternatives [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] .
Another line of research focuses on Authenticated Encryption (AE). AE is a symmetric two-inone solution for secure communications. It provides both con dentiality and authenticity of the encrypted message. AE has recently received signi cant attention in the academy and industry. The CAESAR competition [13] , rst started in 2013, is ongoing to select the most secure, applicable, and robust AEs. AE has many applications in data and network security. For instance, AE can provide con dentiality and dataorigin authentication of network packets. This is also standardized in the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol of the IPSec standard. RFC 7231 [14] proposes AES-GCM [15] and AES-CCM [16] as two AEs suitable for ESP.
A traditional approach to building an AE is to compose a simple (privacy-only) symmetric encryption scheme and a Message Authentication Code (MAC). This approach is called generic composition. For instance, AES-CCM [16] is the composition of AES block cipher in Counter mode of operation, and CBC-MAC message authentication code. Another widely-used generically-composed AE scheme is AES-GCM [15] , which uses GMAC message authentication code instead. Note that composing two encryption and MAC schemes should be done very carefully, as there are many subtleties to build a secure composed scheme [17] . MAC schemes that make use of a block cipher as the building block are good candidates to be employed in generic composition. For instance, CBC-MAC [16] , TMAC [18] , OMAC [19] , and PMAC [20] apply the block cipher encryption on each input block, while GMAC [15] performs a GF (2 128 ) multiplication on each input block, and XORs achieve the output of one blockcipher encryption to mask the multiplications result. Schemes built by the generic composition technique are categorized as two-pass AE schemes. This type of AE processes the input message twice (e.g., invoking the block cipher encryption twice per input block) in order to output the ciphertext and authentication tag. The counterpart AE type is a single-pass AE. IAMP [21] , OCB [22] [23] [24] , and OTR [25] are some well-known singlepass AE schemes; however, all of them are protected by a few patents (or patents pending).
The nal related work for now is the e ort on a lattice-based pseudorandom function (PRF). Banerjee et al. [26] introduced a PRF with a security proof based on lattice problems. PRFs are widely used in the design of symmetric cryptosystems. Subsequently, Banerjee et al. [27] proposed an e cient instantiation of this PRF called SPRING. They used SPRING in the counter (CTR) mode of operation to build a lattice-based symmetric encryption. Their report of the SPRING implementation shows that, using the SIMD feature in high-end processors, the SPRING performance is interestingly comparable to the performance of AES.
In this paper, three authenticated encryption schemes are introduced with security proofs based on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems. The security theorems and proofs of these schemes are exact or concrete. That is, the proved security bound exactly (not asymptotically) determines the maximum success probability of the attacker (To be precise, this bound is usually relative to the security bound of an underlying primitive construction). This approach in provable security is called exact or concrete security, in contrast to the traditional asymptotic security. It is introduced in [28] [29] [30] , which is referred to as the paradigm of practiceoriented provable security. Almost all provably-secure lattice-based schemes in the literature are supported by an asymptotic security proof, though.
The proposed schemes, referred to as LAE1, LAE2, and LAE3, use the lattice-based pseudorandom function SPRING as the building block. The proposed AEs based on SPRING have the following particular advantages over the previous AE constructions.
Firstly, the proposed schemes are alternatives to the conventional AE schemes based on a block cipher (e.g., AES) in the post-quantum era. The bestknown quantum attack to current AE schemes is a corollary of the work of Grover [31] . In this attack, any generic symmetric encryption with an n-bit key can be broken in time O(2 n=2 ) using a quantum computer. Thus, a traditional AE that uses AES-256 has 128 bits of post-quantum security. Furthermore, recent work [32, 33] proposes quantum attacks to some symmetric cryptosystems; however, they use superposition queries, which assume a very strong attack model. Instead of traditional AEs, the proposed lattice-based schemes are supported by a security proof against quantum attackers, which may help if a better quantum algorithm is discovered to break AES or other AEs based on a block-cipher. Secondly, in most applications, such as IPSec or Transport Layer Security (TLS), an AE is utilized within a form of hybrid encryption. Hybrid encryption makes use of an asymmetric scheme to distribute a symmetric session key. After that, the session key is provided to the AE scheme to encrypt bulk data. The asymmetric schemes used in hybrid encryption include Public-Key Encryption (PKE), Key Encapsulation/transport Mechanism (KEM), and Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE). By using a traditional number-theoretic asymmetric scheme (e.g., based on RSA, Di e-Hellman, or Elliptic curve Di e-Hellman { DH and ECDH), the entire system becomes vulnerable to a quantum attack.
Thus, for a quantum-resistant hybrid encryption, a post-quantum variant of the asymmetric part is required. Integrating the proposed AEs with a lattice-based PKE, KEM, or AKE (e.g., the ones proposed in [34] ) has an important advantage that the resulting hybrid encryption depends only on one (type of) security assumption. Otherwise, the security of the system is being compromised if there is a aw either in the assumption of the AE part or in the assumption of the asymmetric scheme used for the key distribution. Thirdly, utilizing lattice-based schemes in both the AE part and the asymmetric part of a hybrid encryption has e ciency bene ts, especially for hardware level implementations. The Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) over nite rings is a major computation task of the proposed AEs and most asymmetric schemes based on (ideal) lattices. Considerable amount of silicon area or FPGA slices can be saved if the common computations are refactored. Therefore, the proposed AEs should be advantageous in post-quantum cryptographic (co-)processors. Fourthly, as presented in Section 5, the performance of the proposed AE schemes is comparable with that of conventional provably-secure AEs. For instance, one of the proposed schemes, LAE2, has a competitive performance in IP packet encryption. Assuming a small packet to be 40 bytes and a large packet to be 1500 bytes, it is only 12% and 24% slower than AES-256-GCM for small IP packets on Sandy Bridge and Haswell CPUs, respectively. On the other hand, it is 34% and 15% faster than AES-256-GCM for large IP packets, respectively, on the targeted microarchitectures.
The proposed schemes have also some drawbacks over traditional AEs based on block ciphers. These constructions are designed over ideal lattices [35] . An ideal lattice has more algebraic structure than a general one. This algebraic structure helps design more e cient cryptographic schemes, both in terms of speed and key size. However, the hardness assumption of lattice problems over ideal lattices is stronger. Speci cally, SPRING's security proof relies on the hardness of the Ring Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE) problem [35] , which is the version of LWE problem over an ideal lattice. Another issue is the very large sized key of the proposed schemes. This is detailed below and in Section 5 along with the implementation results. One solution to the issue of large keys is to utilize a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). The PRNG is seeded with a short key to generate the larger key of each lattice-based AE.
The rst proposed AE scheme is a nonce-based Encrypt-and-MAC (E&M) composition. On the encryption part, SPRING is used in a nonce-based variant of CTR mode. The authentication part, which ensures the authenticity of both nonce and message, is a CBC-MAC similar to XCBC [36] , TMAC [16] , and OMAC [19] . There are some challenges to adopt SPRING to be used in such cryptographic schemes. Most of these schemes are designed to use a (strong) pseudorandom permutation (PRP), which is the formal model of a block cipher. Some schemes, such as OCB mode of operation [24] , are fundamentally dependent on the bijection property of PRPs and cannot directly accept a PRF (Note that a PRP can be built from any PRF by a Feistel-like construction [37] ; however, it makes performance worse). Another challenge to utilizing SPRING in cryptosystems is that the SPRING input and output sizes are not the same. It accepts 128 bits as input and provides 127 bits as output. That introduces a number of padding and truncation operations, complicating the security proof. Moreover, the output is not a multiple of bytes and causes some obstacles in the implementation (see Section 5) . Another challenge affecting the design of a scheme based on SPRING is that most signi cant optimizations can be achieved only by a certain con guration of SPRINGs (see Section 3.2).
The second proposed AE scheme is an Encryptthen-MAC (EtM) composition. The encryption part of the second scheme is similar to the previous one; however, the use of SPRING in the authentication part is minimized. Both of these AEs are two-pass, i.e., they are as ine cient as running encryption and MAC separately.
The third proposed scheme is designed to be single-pass. Until recently, all single-pass AEs could not essentially use a PRF instead of a PRP. For instance, IACBC, IAPM [21] , OCB variants [22] [23] [24] , and stateful XECB and ECBC [38] cannot accept a PRF. The design of the third scheme is inspired by OTR [25] . Minematsu [25] proposed two variants of OTR, which accept both PRF and PRP. However, the third scheme cannot directly follow the PRF-compatible version of OTR because it requires a Variable-Input-Length PRF (VILPRF), while the SPRING's input length is xed. In this scheme, a tweakable PRF is created using SPRING.
The implementation results of the Intel Sandy Bridge and Haswell microarchitectures show that the second proposed scheme, LAE2, is e cient enough to be used in practice and compete widely-used AEs. On Sandy Bridge, although this scheme is 12% slower than AES-256-GCM for encrypting 40-byte messages, it becomes faster for the messages of length 64 bytes or longer. Particularly, for a 1500-byte message, this scheme is 34% faster than AES-256-GCM. A similar result is also achieved on Haswell. LAE2 is 24% slower for 40-byte messages in comparison with AES-256-GCM; however, it becomes faster for 100-byte messages and longer. Additionally, it is 15% faster than AES-256-GCM for 1500-byte messages. The main comparison is performed with AES-256-GCM because the security of this scheme is 128 bits in the postquantum setting. The performance comparison with AES-128-GCM is also presented in Section 5. Similar to most lattice-based cryptographic schemes, the key size of these schemes is very large. The size of the keys for LAE2 and LAE3 is around 6 KB, and the key size of LAE1 is around 12 KB.
For the sake of simplicity, we have not considered common complementary AE features in the three proposed AE schemes, such as the support of associated data (AEADs) [39] , nonce misuse-resistance [40] , and online environment requirements.
Organization
Section 2 introduces the preliminary cryptographic de nitions and notations used in this paper. The proposed two-pass AE schemes and the single-pass one are described in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. These sections also include the design rationale, security theorems, and proofs of the constructions. Section 5 is devoted to the implementation of the proposed schemes. The e ciency and performance results are presented in this section. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Preliminaries 2.1. Notations msb`(x) is the string consisting of the`most signi cant bits of x. pad n (x) is the n-bit string obtained by concatenating a 1 and optionally a few 0's to the right of string x. The notation n is the operator that splits the right-hand string into a list of n-bit strings, except the last one, which may be shorter. The concatenation of two bit strings a and b is denoted by akb. By x $ S, we mean a uniform sampling of x from nite set S. Func(n;`) is the set of all functions from nbit to`-bit strings. Similarly, Perm(`) is the set of all permutation functions from`-bit to`-bit strings.
A family of functions F = fF K g is a set of functions indexed by the key K. A O K ( ; ) denotes a machine A with oracle access to O K . Oracle O K ( ; ) has two inputs under the control of A. However, she cannot access the the parameter K embedded inside.
Polynomial additions and multiplications in GF (2 128 ) and GF (2 127 ) are performed modulo x 128 + x 127 + x 126 + x 121 + 1 and x 127 + x 126 + 1, respectively, which are typical irreducible polynomials. The elements of GF(2 n ) may be represented in three ways and be interchanged frequently. An n-bit string Y = y n 1 :::y 1 y 0 is equivalent to the polynomial y n 1 x n 1 + ::: + y 1 x + y 0 , and is also equivalent to the number obtained by base-2 interpretation of Y . For instance, 2Y , 3Y , and 4Y are the multiplication of polynomials x, x + 1, and x 2 , respectively, with the polynomial equivalent to string Y . Multiplication of a small constant with a eld element can be performed very e ciently using a few shift and XOR operations.
The success probability or advantage of an adversary A is denoted by Adv G S[F] (A), where S is the cryptographic scheme being attacked by A, F is the (family of the) building block used in S, and G is the security model or security game in which A is modeled.
$( ) and $( ; ) are oracles that, on each query, return a fresh random bit string of speci ed length.
Pseudorandom functions and message authentication codes
For the integers n ` 1, a family of functions F = F K : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g` is a pseudorandom function (PRF) if for any adversary A, with ordinary number of queries and resources, the following advantage is small [41, De nition 2.1]:
A pseudorandom permutation (PRP) is the family P = P K : f0; 1g`! f0; 1g` of one-to-one and onto 
SPRING pseudorandom function
The SPRING pseudorandom function, presented by SPR K : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g`in this paper, is the SPRING-CRT function in the work of Banerjee et al. [27] . This function is de ned as follows: 
In this equation, the polynomial a 2 R n p = Z p [x]=(x n + 1) is a xed uniformly-random polynomial and is a parameter of the function. Moreover, K = fs 1 ; :::; s n g is the function key, in which each polynomial s j is in the R n p ring. All multiplications are also performed in R n p . The function MSBs : R n p ! f0; 1g`is an encoding function that concatenates the most signi cant bit of each coe cient to make an n-bit string. Then, by truncating the last bit, we obtain a pseudorandom output of length`= n 1 bits.
3. Two-pass lattice-based authenticated encryption 3.1. Using a CBC-MAC variant
The rst proposed authenticated encryption scheme, referred to as LAE1, is illustrated in Figure 1 . It is obtained by an Encrypt-and-MAC (E&M) composition of a nonce-based symmetric encryption scheme and a Message Authentication Code (MAC). The encryption part is built using SPRING in the CTR mode, in which the indices given to the SPRINGs have two segments. The rst segment is the nonce N, which is xed for all SPRINGs of the encryption part. The second segment is the block number encoded with a Gray code. The input and output of SPRING are n and bits, respectively. The length of the nonce is xed to w bits. The SPRING functions of the encryption part use K 1 as the key. The authentication part is a variant of CBC-MAC [41] . The concatenation of the nonce and message will be fed into a CBC-chain of SPRINGs. The SPRINGs in the authentication part use a di erent key K 2 in order to ensure a safe composition. In the processing of the last block, another parameter is XORed with the input of SPRING, which depends on the third short key K 3 . The multiplication of 2 by K 3 , in the full-last-block case, is performed in GF(2`) using at most one shift and one XOR. The encryption procedure of LAE1 is shown in Scheme 1. The decryption procedure is easily obtained by XORing the given ciphertext C with X[i] to obtain M and computing the expected tag T from M in the forward direction. If T is the same as the given tag T , then the successfully decrypted message M is returned.
Otherwise, only a ? is returned.
Design rationale The authentication part of LAE1 is a stand-alone MAC based on SPRING as the underlying primitive. It is similar to TMAC [18] with a few di erences. TMAC uses a block cipher instead of a PRF. In addition, TMAC does not have a parameter to adjust the tag length. The input and output lengths of the underlying function in TMAC (i.e., the block cipher) are the same, while the SPRING output is shorter than its input. There are some alternatives to be used as a base to construct a SPRING-based MAC. A structure similar to OMAC [19] may seem to be advantageous as it requires only one key for the authentication (LAE1 uses two keys K 2 ; and K 3 for this purpose); however, it needs an extra invocation of SPRING which is relatively heavy. Moreover, the length of extra key K 3 is n bits, which is much smaller than the size of SPRING keys K 1 and K 2 (see Section 5 for the e ciency results). Similar to [27] , to achieve a better performance, the SPRING input in the encryption part is designed to be a Gray-code counter, consisting of a xed part N and the Gray-code encoding of the block number.
A SPRING-based parallel MAC can be built using a structure similar to PMAC [20] . This makes the authenticated encryption scheme parallel (the encryption part is already parallel). However, the overall performance is not so di erent from LAE1, as the SPRING inputs are again non-Gray-code. As mentioned before, the type of the composition used in LAE1 is Encrypt-and-MAC (E&M). Instead of the Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) technique in which the ciphertext is given to the MAC algorithm, E&M allows parallel processing of the ciphertext and tag. To build an AE using the EtM generic composition, Bellare and Namprempre [43] claimed that performing a MAC only on the ciphertext was su cient. However, Namprempre et al. [17] showed that their results could not be applied directly to the once-based authenticated encryption. Thus, we cannot save one SPRING invocation using the EtM technique.
Namprempre et al. [17] proposed secure E&M generic compositions. LAE1 has some di erences with the proposed constructions in [17] . Mainly, the authors of this paper insisted on the use of a single key and derived subsequent keys via a PRF. However, LAE1 has three di erent keys for the sake of running time e ciency. 3.1.1. Security of LAE1 Theorems 1 and 2 show the security of LAE1.
Theorem 1 (privacy of LAE1)
Fix n ` 1. Let F = fF : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g`g be a family of functions. For any adversary A to attack the privacy of LAE1 [F] , who runs in time t and asks q oracle queries with a maximum length of m blocks for each query, there exists an adversary P against the pseudorandomness of F, and we have:
Moreover, adversary P asks q 0 = 2 + q oracle queries and runs in time t 0 = 2t + t F + n( + q), where t F is the time to compute F and is a constant depending on the model of the computation.
Theorem 2 (authenticity of LAE1) 
where q = q e +q d . Moreover, adversary P asks q 0 = + q oracle queries and runs in time t 0 = t+t F + n(+q), where t F is the time to compute F and is a constant depending on the model of the computation. 2`+ 1 + q 2 2 n+1 : (10) Note that this result is independent of the computational resources of A.
Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose that T is the MAC part of the LAE1 scheme.
We introduce fFCBC as a variant of FCBC [36] 
We now consider each of these two pairs of probabilities. The second pair is the information-theoretic security of fFCBC, which is analyzed in Section 3. 
Moreover, adversary P 2 asks q 0 = (+q)q oracle queries and runs in time t 0 = t+ n(+q), where is a constant depending on the model of the computation. Lemma 3 is the complexity-theoretic counterpart of Lemma 2, which can be proven in a standard way (for example, see [41, Then, it generates a random key K 1 to compute C.
Moreover, upon a decryption query from A, it decrypts C to obtain M and sends (N; M ; T ) to its forgery (decryption) oracle. As a result, we simply have:
and the theorem is proved.
Security of fFCBC
In this section, the information-theoretic security of fFCBC is presented. At rst, suppose that fCBC is the plain CBC mode, instantiated with a PRF function. The collision probability of fCBC is de ned as follows: 
where the probability is taken over random function . Moreover, the following equations hold: 
Now, to bound the probability of setting the bad ag, note that it is set to true in lines 5, 11, and 17 of Game 1. Just before these lines X i or X 0 i are assigned and if it is in the domain of , the bad ag is set. For the case in which the bad ag has not been yet set to true, the value assigned to X i or X 0 i is uniformlyrandom and independent. That is because the value of Y i 1 or Y 0 i 1 is uniformly-random and independent, and it is XORed with the message to form X i or X 0 i . If there are i 1 values in the domain of , the probability of a collision for the rst time for a new random value is (i 1)=2`. Thus, the following equation holds: 
where UnpadCol is the event of a collision in the outputs of 3 for unpadded messages, and PadCol is the event of a collision in the outputs of 2 for padded messages. Now, we can break the probability of PadCol as follows:
where Pr[PadCol i ] is the probability that the collision occurs for the rst time after the i-th padded query, and q pad is the total number of padded queries. Note that PadCol i 's are disjoint. Because there is no collision in the rst i 1 queries, the responses of these queries, sent to the adversary, are uniformly random and independent. Thus, any adaptive strategy of A can be changed to a nonadaptive strategy without loss of advantage. Using the result of Lemma 4, we have:
and the nal bound on the probability of PadCol is: 
The same bound is also applied for UnpadCol. Finally, the theorem result is obtained:
Pr show that SPRING computation is the most timeconsuming part of the execution. The idea of designing a more e cient scheme is to reduce the number of SPRING invocations in the authentication part. We have used the technique of Wegman and Carter [45] to build a MAC using a universal class of hash functions and the lattice-based PRF SPRING. In order to apply this technique, the ciphertext is given to a secret function from an XOR-universal class of hash functions [46] , and the output is masked with the PRF output on a fresh and unique input. Scheme 2 and Figure 2 show the second proposed lattice-based AE, referred to as LAE2, using the Carter-Wegman method [45] . Multiplications in this scheme are performed in GF(2 n ). The encryption part is the same as before in LAE1. The universal class of hash functions utilized in LAE2 is de ned as follows: Here, m = jCj`and the polynomial a 2 GF(2 n ) is the function index. All the operations are performed in GF(2 n ).
Using an XOR-universal hash function built by iterative multiplications of a secret polynomial a 2 GF(2 n ) is similar to the NIST-recommended GCM mode of operation [15] . However, GCM encrypts a constant block (zero block) to derive the second key for authentication, while LAE2 uses another key K 2 to save one SPRING invocation (see the more detailed discussion in Section 3.1 on a similar case). Moreover, there are many pad and msb functions involved because of asymmetry between the input and output length of SPRING, which should be handled carefully in the security proof. Although LAE2 is considered as a two-pass authenticated encryption scheme, the multiplications in GF(2 n ) can be computed very e ciently. Thus, the authentication part is much more e cient than LAE1. Typical high-end processors have instruction set extensions to perform this operation in a few clock cycles (see Section 5 for more details on the ones used in our benchmarks). Moreover, when an old or constrained processor is required, or in the case of hardware implementations, this multiplication can also be performed e ciently using a moderate-sized precomputed lookup table. Nevertheless, both LAE1 and LAE2 are not fully parallel, and their authentication part should be computed sequentially.
It is worth mentioning that replacing the majority of SPRING functions with polynomial multiplications in GF(2 n ) does not introduce any new security assumption in LAE2. The hardness of lattice problems is still the only supporting assumption. Thus, many SPRING invocations in the authentication part of LAE1 are reduced to only one in LAE2, without any loss in the security level. Moreover, adversary P asks q 0 = + q oracle queries and runs in time t 0 = t + ( + q)t + n( + q), where t is the time to compute a GF(2 n ) multiplication, and is a constant depending on the model of the computation.
Theorem 5 (authenticity of LAE2). Fix n 1. Let F = fF : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g`g be a family of functions. For any adversary A to attack the authenticity of LAE2 [F] , who runs in time t and asks q e encryption and q d decryption queries, each of which with a total length of e and d blocks, there exists an adversary P against the pseudorandomness of F, and we have:
where q = q e + q d . Moreover, adversary P asks q 0 = e q e + q d oracle queries and runs in time t 0 = t + ( + q)t + n( + q), where = e + d , t is the time to compute a GF(2 n ) multiplication, and is a constant depending on the model of the computation. The proofs of Theorems 4 and 5 are presented in Section 3.2.2.
Security proofs
The proof sketch of Theorem 4 is as follows. The problem in the information-theoretic setting, i.e., when F $ Func(n;`), is simple. Both ciphertext C and tag T are XORed with the output of F . In addition, a nonce-respecting adversary A always queries with a fresh nonce N. Thus, the distribution of (C; T ) is perfectly uniform. Transition from information-theoretic to complexity-theoretic setting is also standard.
Theorem 5 can be proven in a standard way from Lemma 5.
Lemma 5 (authenticity of ideal LAE2). Fix n 1. Let R = Func(n;`). For any adversary A asking q e encryption and q d decryption queries, we have:
where q = q e + q d .
Proof of Lemma 5
The technique of sequences of games [47] is used to prove this result. Game 2 (G 0 ) simulates the environment of Lemma 5 for adversary A. There is an exception whose AuthDecrypt procedure in G 0 returns true instead of the message in the case that the forgery is successful. However, this di erence can be ignored because the following equation always holds.
Note that, without loss of generality, we can assume that adversary A is deterministic. Therefore, the probability is taken only over the random function sampled from R.
G 0 models random function using the lazy sampling technique. Games G 1 and G 2 are speci ed in Game 3. The underlined statements exist only in game 
However, as the AuthDecrypt procedure of G 2 
Note that bad 1 never occurs because A is noncerespecting and never provides repeated nonces to the AuthEncrypt oracle. This is true even if the nonce value N, given to AuthEncrypt, has been repeatedly used in previous AuthDecrypt queries. We de ne Pr[G A 2 sets bad 2 on q i ] as the probability that bad 2 is set to true on the i-th query for the rst time. As these probabilities are disjoint, we have:
Pr[G A 2 sets bad 2 on q i ]: (45) Now, we bound Pr[G A 2 sets bad 2 on q i ]. For the decryption queries, we have:
We claim that the event T i = T i is independent of all the previous queries q j (j < i) with N j 6 = N i . If q j is an encryption query, the returned C j is uniformly random and independent, and T j is deterministically calculated from C j . If q j is a decryption query, the returned ? only reveals that T j 6 = T j , where T j is independent of the event T i = T i . Now, we assume that adversary A uses the same nonce N for all the queries prior and include q i , to maximize the probability of setting bad 2 on q i . There are two cases in this setting:
-Case 1: All the previous queries are AuthDecrypt, and are responded by a ?. In this case, for j < i, it is revealed to A that T j 6 = T j = msb H K2 (C j ) N , where N = msb ( (Nk gray(0))) and is common between all the queries. Thus, at most 2` choices of K 2 become invalid after each query. On the other hand, only one of the choices makes T i = T i . Therefore, the following equation holds:
-Case 2: Exactly one of the previous queries is AuthEncrypt. Assume that q k (1 k < i)
is the encryption query. The other queries are all AuthDecrypt and are responded by a ?. Thus, A has a tuple (M k ; C k ; T k ) for which T k = msb H K 2 (C k ) N holds. Due to the fact that N is an independent and uniformly-random value (random function F evaluated on fresh nonce N), T k has also this property. Hence, the pair (C k ; T k ) causing at most 2` choices of K 2 becomes invalid; similar to Case 1, Eq. (47) holds. Moreover, another strategy is to perform exhaustive search on the correct tag with an advantage of q d =2 . Finally, we can conclude as follows:
4. Single-pass lattice-based authenticated encryption LAE1 and LAE2 perform the encryption and authentication processes separately, running the underlying primitive twice per message block. A single-pass AE performs these tasks in a single processing. To be more speci c, it calls the primitive function or permutation once per input block, in addition to a few constant number of calls. Firstly, Jutla [21] introduced the rst secure single-pass authenticated encryption IAPM. Rogaway et al. [22] extended this idea to build OCB, which is a fast and well-featured AE [23, 24] . Scheme 3 is the third proposed AE scheme, referred to as LAE3. It is derived from a recent AE from Minematsu [25] called OTR. OTR is an extension to OCB, which uses a Feistel structure to replace each pair of block ciphers in OCB with a pair of PRFs. Figure 3 shows the structure and data ow of LAE3. In this scheme, similar to the last block of LAE1, a whitening value is XORed with the input of SPRING to obtain a tweakable PRF. The polynomial operations in this scheme are performed in GF(2`). Note that the multiplication of small constants, for instance in 4 and 2L, are easily computed by some shifts and XORs. For the sake of simplicity, the input of SPRING is reduced to`bits in LAE3. Thus, both input and output of SPRING are`bits in this scheme. The remaining least signi cant (n `) bits are padded with zero. Note that, in Scheme 3 and Figure 3 , this padding is considered inside the SPRING function and is not applied explicitly.
There are two di erences between LAE3 and OTR. Firstly, the block cipher is replaced with a PRF. Although [25] introduced a PRF-capable version of OTR; however, there were technical issues about the integration of SPRING in this scheme. The proposed scheme does not use the OTR technique to obtain a tweakable PRF from SPRING. Instead, some whitening value is XORed with the input of SPRING. The other di erence is that the input and output lengths of SPRING are not equal. We use only`bits of SPRING input (padding it with zeroes) to make the input and output lengths the same. There are few proposals for single-pass nonlattice-based authenticated encryption in the literature. The methods of IAPM [21] and OCB [22] [23] [24] cannot be followed in the case of SPRING. In these schemes, the plaintext is directly fed into the underlying primitive function, and the output becomes a part of the ciphertext. PRFs are not useful in this setting because a PRF is not necessarily a bijection; hence, it has data loss. Only a pseudorandom permutation (e.g., a block cipher) can be used in such designs. Minematsu [25] introduced OTR as a PRF-capable single-pass AE. OTR utilizes the tweak-prepending technique to construct a tweakable PRF from a normal one. Unfortunately, this technique cannot be applied to SPRING. That is because SPRING has a xed and short input length n, while tweak-prepending requires a variable-input-length PRF or one with a large-enough input length. Alternatively, the input whitening technique is used in LAE3. In this case, the outputs of some functions of an XOR-universal class are XORed with the input of SPRINGs to make a tweakable PRF. As a nal note, LAE3 requires a fresh for each nonce N. Thus, we cannot save a SPRING invocation, similar to LAE1, by introducing the second key.
Security of LAE3
Theorems 6 and 7 show the security of LAE3.
Theorem 6 (privacy of LAE3)
Fix n ` 1. Let F = fF : f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g`g be a family of functions. For any adversary A to attack the privacy of LAE3 [F] , who runs in time t and asks q encryption queries, with a maximum total length of blocks, there exists an adversary P against the pseudorandomness of F, and we have:
Adv ind-cpa LAE3 [F] (A) Adv prf F (P) + 6(q + ) 2 2`:
Moreover, adversary P asks q 0 = + 2q oracle queries, and runs in time t 0 = t+ `(+q), where is a constant depending on the model of the computation.
Theorem 7 (authenticity of LAE3) 
Proofs of Theorems 6 and 7
We skip the proofs of Theorems 6 and 7 as they are similar to the privacy and authenticity proofs of OTR [25, Theorems 1 and 2] . The main di erence is that the associated data are not involved in the proof because LAE3 does not support it.
Comparison and performance results
In this section, the e ciency and performance results of the proposed schemes are reported. These schemes are implemented with moderate optimizations. The target of the implementations are high-end processors because single-instruction multiple-data (SIMD) is utilized to speed up polynomial operations of the latticebased AEs. The source codes of the implementations are integrated into the OpenSSL framework to be benchmarked along with the optimized implementation of AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM in OpenSSL. GCM [15] is an e cient and widely-used authenticated encryption mode of operation. AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM are two instantiations of GCM using 128-bit and 256-bit AES, respectively. The implemented lattice-based schemes are parameterized with n = 128,`= 127, p = 514, and w = 96 to claim 128-bit security in the pre-and post-quantum settings. Consequently, AES-256-GCM is also included in the comparison, which is 128-bit secure in the post-quantum setting. The three proposed schemes LAE1, LAE2, and LAE3 are implemented based on the SPRING implementation provided by its designers [27] . The implementation of the SPRING function in LAE3 and in the authentication part of LAE1 cannot make use of the optimizations introduced in [27, Section 3] regarding the Gray-code input.
The proposed schemes are implemented in C++ and integrated with the benchmark of OpenSSL version 1.0.1i. The OpenSSL benchmark is modi ed to feed more variable sizes of input, and use the \rdtsc" instruction to count the processor clocks. The instruction set of the Intel Carry-Less Multiplication (CLMUL) is used to multiply polynomials in GF (2 128 ). The benchmarking process is executed on one CPU core. The source code is compiled using GCC version 4.8.2. Two compiler options \O3" and \march=native" are speci ed in order to con gure the compiler to generate optimized codes according to the targeted processors. Thus, the source code is recompiled on each targeted machine. The Intel SSE2 instruction set is utilized indirectly by using vector processing features of GCC. OpenSSL, and the integrated new schemes were built into a 64-bit binary executable. The benchmark is run on a 64-bit Linux machine with kernel version 3.13.30. Two Intel CPUs are used in the experiments. The rst one is Intel Core i3-2120 running at 3.3GHz with Sandy Bridge microarchitecture, and the second one is Intel Core i7-4770 running at 3.4GHz with Haswell microarchitecture. Table 1 presents the processor clock cycles on Intel Sandy Bridge and Haswell microarchitectures, running the encryption procedures of LAE1, LAE2, and LAE3. Figure 4 also shows these results in a form of graph. The lengths chosen for the plaintexts are powers of 2 and 10 bytes in order to cover both complete and incomplete last blocks, as well as common IP packet sizes 40, 576, 1300, and 1500 bytes. Note that OpenSSL is con gured not to use AES-NI instruction set of Intel CPUs for AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM.
Although LAE3 is of single-pass, it is not more efcient than the two-pass LAE2 due to the optimization techniques applied to the lattice-based PRF SPRING. SPRING is very e cient if it runs multiple times given the values of a Gray-code counter. In this environment, the aggregated computation of each SPRING is reduced signi cantly. In the case of LAE1, only the encryption part enjoys the optimization for the Graycode input. As an improvement, the authentication part of LAE2 utilizes GF(2 128 ) multiplications instead of a chain of SPRINGs. There is only one SPRING invocation in the authentication part, which is also in the sequence of the encryption Gray-code counter. Therefore, SPRING computation is highly optimized in LAE2. The authentication pass is removed in LAE3, though the SPRING's inputs are no longer from a Gray-code counter, resulting in a less e cient scheme than LAE2. All the three proposed schemes are computationally heavy for very short plaintexts (e.g., less than 40 bytes). Only LAE2 becomes good for larger inputs. This phenomenon is common in symmetric encryption schemes; however, it is a more considerable issue in the case of the proposed latticebased schemes because the saving in the aggregated computation of SPRINGs is substantial.
If a small IP packet to be 40 bytes and a large IP packet to be 1500 bytes are considered, LAE1 is the least e cient scheme of all the other proposed schemes to be used for IP packet encryption. It is around twice slower than AES-256-GCM for both small and large packet sizes on Haswell and Sandy Bridge microarchitectures. LAE3 has a better performance; as for small IP packets, it is 146% and 151% slower than AES-256-GCM on Sandy Bridge and Haswell, respectively. However, for large IP packets, this scheme is 28% and 36% slower than AES-256-GCM, respectively. LAE2 has the best performance among the proposed AE schemes. It is only 12% and 24% slower than AES-256-GCM for small IP packets on Sandy Bridge and Haswell, respectively. Finally, it is 34% and 15% faster than AES-256-GCM for large IP packets, respectively, on the targeted microarchitectures. Table 2 also shows the comparison of the key sizes between the proposed schemes and the two references AES-128-GCM and AES-256-GCM. Similar to most lattice-based cryptographic schemes, the key sizes of the proposed AEs are very large. These sizes are for the key before applying the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). The issue of large keys can be managed in practice by utilizing a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). The PRNG is seeded with a short key to generate the larger key of each lattice-based AE. Note that the PRNG is executed only once in the key setup phase. It is similar to the key expansion process in block cipherbased AEs, which is usually not a performance critical task.
Conclusion
In this paper, three Authenticated Encryption (AE) schemes LAE1, LAE2, and LAE3, which enjoy a security proof based on hard lattice problems, were presented. In addition, the exact security of these schemes in the paradigm of practice-oriented provable security was analyzed and proved. The proposed schemes have the following motivations and advantages over the previous AE constructions: (1) These schemes are alternatives to conventional AEs based on a block cipher, which may help if a quantum algorithm is discovered to break, e.g., AES; (2) If they are combined with a lattice-based asymmetric scheme for key distribution; then, the resulting hybrid encryption depends only on one (type of) security assumption. Otherwise, if a block-cipher-based AE (e.g., AES-GCM) is combined with an entirely di erent asymmetric key distribution (e.g., an RSA-based one), then a aw or a new attack to the assumption of each part (AES-GCM, or RSA) breaks the whole security; (3) Computational resources can be saved in the case of a hybrid encryption which uses the proposed AEs as well as a lattice-based asymmetric scheme, due to the fact that some primitive computations are in common; (4) Our implementation results of the Intel Sandy Bridge and Haswell microarchitectures show that LAE2 is e cient enough to be used in practice and to compete with widely-used AEs. He has published more than 140 papers in international journals and conference proceedings. He is now an Associate Professor, doing research in the areas of computer dependability and security, access control, distributed systems, and database systems in his Data and Network Security Laboratory (DNSL).
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